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I'll Take That: Legal and Public Policy
Problems Raised By Statutes
That Require Punitive Damages Awards
To Be Shared With the State
Victor E. Schwartz*
Mark A. Behrens'
Cary Silverman "
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, the United States has experienced a "dramatic increase"
in the incidence and size of punitive damages verdicts.' The United States

* Victor E. Schwartz is a senior partner in the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon
L.L.P. in Washington, D.C. He is co-author of the most widely used torts casebook in
the United States, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS (I0th ed. 2000), and author
of COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (4th ed. 2002). He served on the Advisory Committees
to the Restatement of the Law of Torts projects on Products Liability and Apportionment
of Liability, and currently sits on the Advisory Committee to the Restatement of the Law
of Torts: General Principles. Mr. Schwartz obtained his B.A. summa cum laude from
Boston University in 1962 and his J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia University in
1965.
** Mark A. Behrens is a partner in the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
in Washington, D.C. He received his B.A. in Economics from the University of
Wisconsin-Madison in 1987 and his J.D. from Vanderbilt University in 1990, where he
served as Associate Articles Editor of the Vanderbilt Law Review.
***Cary Silverman is an associate in the law firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
in Washington, D.C. He received a B.S. in Management Science from the State
University of New York College at Geneseo in 1997, an M.P.A. from The George
Washington University in 2000, and a J.D. with honors from The George Washington
University Law School in 2000, where he served as Managing Editor of The
EnvironmentalLawyer.
1. George L. Priest, The Problem and Efforts to UnderstandIt, Introduction to
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 1 (2002).
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Supreme Court2has expressed concern that punitive damages in this country are
"skyrocketing" and have "run wild."3 States have responded by enacting
various punitive damages reform laws.4 For example, many states have chosen
to raise the burden of proof or standard of liability that must be met before
punitive damages can be awarded.' Other states have addressed the problem of
runaway punitive damages by limiting the amount that can be imposed.6 Some
states have adopted a procedural reform called bifurcation to prevent evidence
that is highly prejudicial and relevant only to the issue of punishment from being
heard by jurors and improperly considered when they are determining liability
for compensatory damages.' Finally, a handful of states have decided to become
"free riders" by requiring successful plaintiffs to share a portion of any punitive
damages recovery with the state (or a state-specified fund).8
This Article will provide a brief review of the purpose and history of
punitive damages. It will then examine the various reforms adopted by the
states, with a particular focus on "split-recovery" laws that require punitive
damages recoveries to be shared with the state or a state-specified fund. This
Article explains that such laws may actually fuel, rather than curb, punitive
damages awards. The Article also explains that these laws are ethically and
constitutionally problematic. This Article concludes that states seeking to reform
their punitive damages laws would be better served by (1) adopting a heightened
burden of proof and liability standard for punitive damages claims, (2) enacting
statutory caps to ensure greater proportionality between punitive and
compensatory damages awards, and (3) providing for a bifurcated trial at a
defendant's request. The split-recovery approach should be rejected.

2. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
3. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
4. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild":
Proposalsfor Reform By Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 1003 (1999). In

Nebraska, punitive damages are constitutionally prohibited. See Distinctive Printing &
Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989). In Louisiana, Massachusetts,

New Hampshire, and Washington, punitive damages are permitted only if expressly
authorized by statute. See Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 828 So. 2d 546, 555 (La. 2002); Pine
v. Rust, 535 NE.2d 1247, 1249 (Mass. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.34.100(1) (West 1994). Michigan prohibits punitive
damages awards, but does permit exemplary damages to compensate plaintiffs for the

sense of humiliation and indignity for injury maliciously or wantonly inflicted. See
Fellows v. Superior Prods. Co., 506 N.W.2d 534, 536 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Veselenak
v. Smith, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Mich. 1982); Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295
N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980).

5. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part IV.
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II. OVERVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Purposeof Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are not ordinary civil or tort law damages. Unlike
compensatory damages, which provide payment for economic losses (e.g., lost
wages and medical expenses) and noneconomic injuries (e.g., pain and
suffering), punitive damages are not awarded to compensate for a harm.9
Instead, they are awarded "to further the aims of the criminal law: 'to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."" They provide a
"windfall" recovery for plaintiffs." As the Iowa Supreme Court observed,
"punitive damages are not intended to be compensatory and.., a plaintiff is a
fortuitous beneficiary of a punitive damages award simply because there is no
one else to receive it."2
B. A Brief History of PunitiveDamages
Punitive, or exemplary, damages were first recognized by the English
common law in the mid-eighteenth century in two cases involving illegal
searches and seizures by officers of the Crown, Huckle v. Money 3 and Wilkes v.
Wood. 4 In those cases, the English courts expressed for the first time that a
"jury [shall] have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury
received ...as punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding in
the future, and as proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself."' 5

9. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,350 (1974) (noting that punitive
damages "are not compensation for injury... [but] are private fines levied by civil juries
to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence"); see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (W. Page Keeton

ed., 5th ed. 1984) (stating that punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant,
teach the defendant not to "do it again," and deter others from engaging in similar
misconduct).
10. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 297
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (quoting Bankers Life &
Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part &
concurring in the judgment)).
11. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270 (1981).
12. Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473
N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (citing Berenger v. Hat, 314 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa
1982)).
13. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
14. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).

15. Id. at 498-99.
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Historically, in England and then America, punitive damages were available only
in a small class of lawsuits, "the traditional intentional torts," designed to punish
an individual's purposeful bad act against another. 6 These included "assault and
battery, libel and slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and
intentional interferences with property."7
In the late 1960s, however, American courts radically expanded the
availability of punitive damages beyond the traditional intentional torts.'" Lesser
misconduct now could merit punitive damages. "Reckless disregard" became
a popular standard for punitive damages liability; 9 even "gross negligence"
became enough to support a punitive damages award in some states.20 A number
of states instituted the "triple trigger" approach of "willful, wanton, or reckless
disregard," providing plaintiffs with three separate paths to obtain punitive
damages.2' In addition, the advent of "mass tort" litigation resulted in an
increase in punitive damages claims against manufacturers,22 including the
possibility of repeated imposition of punitive damages for an alleged risk in a
single product line or resulting from a single act or course of conduct.23
Changes in punitive damages law and practice have impacted both the
incidence and size of punitive damages verdicts. Until 1976, for example, there
were only three reported appellate court decisions upholding awards of punitive
damages in product liability cases, and the punitive damages award in each case
was modest in proportion to the compensatory damages awarded.24 As United

16. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1006-07.
17. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1007 (citations omitted).
18. In 1967, a California court of appeals held for the first time that punitive
damages were recoverable in a strict product liability action. See Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 414 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
19. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1)(a) (2002) ("willful and malicious or
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others").
20. See, e.g., Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1988).
21. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11 -1-65(1)(a) (2003); see also Scott v. Fruehauf Corp.,
396 S.E.2d 354, 357 (S.C. 1990) (recognizing that punitive damages are recoverable in
South Carolina for "willful, wanton, or malicious violation of the plaintiffs rights").
22. "Mass tort" litigation began in the late 1960s with cases involving the sale of
the anti-cholesterol drug MER/29. See Paul D. Rheingold, The MER/29 Story: An
Instance of Successful Mass DisasterLitigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968).
23. Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1029-34. See generally Mark A. Behrens &
Barry M. Parsons, Responsible Public Policy Demands an End to the Hemorrhaging
Effect of Punitive Damagesin Asbestos Cases, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 137 (2001).
24. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 104 (6th Cir. 1975) (awarding
$125,000 compensatory damages, $50,000 attorneys' fees, and $100,000 punitive
damages); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)
(awarding $175,000 compensatory damages and $250,000 punitive damages); Moore v.
Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636, 638 (I11. App. Ct. 1969) (awarding $920,000
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States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recognized, "As little as 30
years ago, punitive damages were 'rarely assessed' and usually 'small in
amount."' 2 By the late 1970s and early 1980s, "unprecedented numbers of
punitive awards in product liability and other mass tort situations began to
27
'
and the size of punitive damages awards "increased dramatically.
surface,"26
The explosion of punitive damages that began in the 1970s shows no signs
of slowing down. "Today, hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-dollar

compensatory damages and $10,000 punitive damages), affd,263 N.E.2d 103 (Il. 1970).
25. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,500 (1993) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also RICHARD L. BLATT ET AL., PuNrnIVE
DAMAGES: A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.2, at 5 (1991)
("[G]enerally before 1955, even if punitive damages were awarded, the size of the
punitive damages award in relation to the compensatory damage award was relatively
small, as even nominal punitive damages were considered to be punishment in and of
themselves.").
26. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986); see also Philip Borowsky & Lee K.
Nicolaisen, Punitive Damagesin California: The Integrity ofJury Verdicts, 17 U.S.F.

L. REV. 147, 148 (1983) (noting trend of "juries... award[ing] substantial punitive
damages with increasing frequency").
27. George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and EnterpriseLiability, 56 S. CAL. L.

REv. 123, 123 (1982).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 1
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 68

punitive damages verdict."28 In fact, multi-billion dollar verdicts are no longer
unheard of.
*

In October of 2002, a Missouri jury awarded $2.2 billion in punitive
damages to a cancer patient whose pharmacist diluted drugs to boost
profits, even though most of the pharmacist's assets had already been
seized.29 The award was later reduced to $330 million.30

"

In October of 1999, a Williamson County, Illinois trial court entered a
judgment of almost $1.18 billion, including $600 million in punitive
damages, against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company in
favor of a nationwide class of State Farm policyholders.31 The case arose
out of a longstanding State Farm practice (also used by other automobile

28. Malcom E. Wheeler, A ProposalforFurtherCommon Law Development ofthe
Use ofPunitive Damagesin Modern ProductsLiabilityLitigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919,
919 (1989) (cited by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion in Pacific Mutual Life
InsuranceCo. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 62 (1991)). Several courts awarded large punitive
damages awards in 2002. See, e.g., Bender v. Darden Rests. Inc., No. 98-5603 1, 2002
WL 74441 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2002) ($1.8 million punitive damages award against
restaurant for denial of meal and rest breaks to workers); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Kan. 2002) (awarding $15 million in punitive
damages); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. Six Flags Over Ga., LLC, 563 S.E.2d 178 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that $257 million punitive damages award against general partner
of amusement park for unfair and deceptive business practices was not excessive);
O'Neill v. Gallant Ins. Co., 769 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (affirming $2.3 million
punitive damages award in insurer bad faith action); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Tuckier, 826 So. 2d 679 (Miss. 2002) ($3 million punitive damages award in wrongful
death action following rollover of vehicle); Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 801 A.2d 1158
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (affirming remittitur of punitive damages award of $4
million to $1.8 million in employment discrimination case); Williams v. Philip Morris
Inc., 48 P.3d 824 (Or. App. 2002) (reversing trial court's reduction of punitive damages
award from $79.5 million to $32 million). Two large punitive damages awards were
vacated by the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of its decision in State
FarmMutualA utomobileInsuranceCo. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). See Romo
v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 162-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), vacated by 123
S. Ct. 2072 (2003) ($290 million punitive damages award stemming from a single
automobile accident); Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky.
2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003) ($15 million award against a product liability
defendant, the largest punitive damages award in Kentucky history).
29. See What's News: World-Wide, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2002, at Al.
30. See MissouriAward Against PharmacistIs Reduced, LIABILITY & INS. WK.,
Feb. 24, 2003, at 5.
31. See Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2001) (finding that $130 million in disgorgement damages was duplicative of the
specification damage award, but affirming the trial courtjudgment in all other respects).
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insurers) of using non-Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) parts to
repair cars after accidents.32 The practice had been fully disclosed to
policyholders. State Farm and others followed this practice to create and
assure a competitive
market with OEM parts and to reduce repair costs for
33
consumers.

In July of 1999, a Los Angeles jury ordered General Motors Corporation to
pay $4.9 billion to six people who were injured when their vehicle was rearended by a speeding drunk driver and caught on fire. The trial judge later
reduced the award to $1.2 billion. The case was settled in 2003 for an
undisclosed amount.34
These astronomical judgments dwarf punitive damages awards that would have
been considered extreme even just a few years ago.
Ell. STATES RESPOND TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES "RUN WILD"
A. Burden of ProofandLiability Requirements
Recognizing that punitive damages are a quasi-criminal penalty, most states
have chosen to require plaintiffs to establish proof of punitive damages liability
by "clear and convincing evidence."35 This middle-ground standard falls
between the ordinary civil law "preponderance of the evidence" standard and the
criminal law standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." The United States
Supreme Court has specifically endorsed the "clear and convincing evidence"
burden of proof in punitive damages cases.36 The standard has also been
recommended by the American Bar Association, the American College of Trial
Lawyers, and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws.37

32. Id. at 1247.
33. See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery: State
CourtRegulation Through LitigationHas Gone Too Far,33 CONN. L. REv. 1215 (2001).
34. See GM to Settle Case Over Gas Tank Explosion, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2003,
at B4; Margaret Cronin Fisk, The Biggest Jury Verdict of 1999: A Typical Verdict Last
Year Was Way Up, But Nothing like This One, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28, 2000, at Al
(discussing Anderson v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. BC 116 926 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles,
Cal. 1999)); Frederic M. Biddle, GM Verdict Cut $3.8 Billion in Suit Over Explosion,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1999, at B5.
35. See Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1013.
36. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n.ll (1991) (stating that
"[t]here is much to be said in favor of a State's requiring, as many do... a standard of
'clear and convincing evidence"').
37. See MODEL PuNrrIvE DAMAGES ACT § 5, 14 U.L.A. 124 (Supp. 2003)
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In addition, Maryland and the District of Columbia have restricted punitive
damages awards to cases in which the defendant acted with "actual malice."38
This standard reflects the intentional tort origins of punitive damages, and it
helps courts and jurors separate conduct that is particularly reprehensible and
worthy of punishment from that which is not.
B. Caps on PunitiveDamages
Proportionality has been an important part of the United States Supreme
Court's consideration of the validity of criminal punishment.39 Even very serious
crimes such as larceny, robbery, and arson have sentences with a defined
statutory maximum. 40 In the civil context, the Court has ruled that punitive
damages must bear some relationship to the actual harm, but has declined "to
draw a bright line marking the limits of a constitutionally acceptable punitive
damages award."'" A number of states have acted to provide that clarity by
defining the acceptable outer limits of punishment.4 ' These statutory limits vary
from Colorado, where punitive damages may not exceed compensatory
damages,4" to Kansas, where punitive damages are limited to the lesser of $5

(approved in 1996) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]; Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Report on
Punitive Damages of the Committee on Special Problems in the Administration of
Justice, 1989, at 15-16 [hereinafter ACTL Report]; Special Comm. on Punitive Damages,
Section of Litigation, Am. Bar Ass'n, Recommendations, 1986, at 19 [hereinafter ABA
Report]; see also 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR

PERSONAL INJURY, APPROACHES TO LEGAL INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 248-49 (1991)
[hereinafter ALl REPORTERS' STUDY].
38. See Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929 (D.C. 1995); OwensIllinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992).
39. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) ("The principle that a
punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated
in common-law jurisprudence."); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,366-67 (1910)
(stating that it is "a precept of the fundamental law" as well as "a precept of justice that
punishment should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense").
40. See Schwartz et al., supra note 4, at 1015 n.58.
41. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996); see also State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1516 (2003) (stating that "in practice,
few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio will satisfy due process").
42. The need for proportionality in punitive damages is supported by academic
groups. See ALI REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 37, at 258-59 (endorsing concept of
ratio coupled with alternative monetary ceiling); ACTL Report, supra note 37, at 15

(proposing that punitive damages be awarded up to the greater of two times a plaintiff's
compensatory damages or $250,000); ABA Report, supra note 37, at 64-66

(recommending that punitive damages awards in excess of three-to-one ratio to
compensatory damages be considered presumptively "excessive").
43. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (2000).
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million or the defendant's annual gross income." The most common approach
is to limit punitive damages awards to the greater of (1) a ratio of the plaintiff s
compensatory damages award (e.g., two times compensatory damages or three
times compensatory damages) or (2) a dollar amount set by law (e.g.,
$250,000)." "This flexible approach accomplishes punishment and deterrence
in the unusual situation where there is serious misconduct and relatively minor
actual damages.""'
C. Bifurcation
Punitive damages trials often involve evidence that is relevant only to the
amount of punishment, if any, to be meted out against the defendant. For
example, evidence of a defendant's wealth is irrelevant with respect to the basic
issue of whether the defendant caused the plaintiffs alleged harm, but courts
frequently admit such evidence for the purpose of allowing the jury to set civil
punishment. Net worth evidence is highly prejudicial. If presented to a jury
when it is determining compensatory damages liability, such evidence may cause
jurors to render a compensatory award simply because they believe that the
47
defendant "can afford it."
Bifurcated trials help prevent that unfair result. In a bifurcated proceeding,
the jury first resolves the issue of compensatory damages before determining the
amount of punitive damages, if any, to be paid by the defendant. Evidence
relevant only to the issue of punishment is inadmissible during the compensatory
damages phase of the trial. Bifurcated trials also help jurors "compartmentalize"
trial proceedings. By tackling compensatory and punitive issues separately,
jurors are better able to separate the burden of proof that is required for

44. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(e) (1994). If the court finds that the
profitability of the conduct exceeds the amount of the general limitation, the court may
award an amount equal to one and one-half times the amount of the profit which the
defendant gained or is expected to gain as a result of the conduct. Id. § 60-3701(f).
45. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73 (Supp. 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4
(Michie 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25(b) (1999).

46. See Schwartz et al., supranote 4, at 1015.
47. As United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993),
Corporations are mere abstractions and, as such, are unlikely to be viewed

with much sympathy. Moreover, they often represent a large accumulation of
productive resources; jurors naturally think little of taking an otherwise large
sum of money out of what appears to be an enormously larger pool of wealth.
Finally, juries may feel privileged to correct perceived social ills stemming

from unequal wealth distribution by transferring money from "wealthy"
corporations to comparatively needier plaintiffs.
Id. at 491 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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compensatory damage awards (i.e., proof by a preponderance of the evidence)
from a heightened burden of proof for punitive damages (e.g., proof by clear and
convincing evidence).
Recognizing the benefit of bifurcation, some courts have adopted bifurcated
trial procedures as a matter of common law reform.48 Other states have made
changes through court rules or legislation.49 The American Bar Association, the
American College of Trial Lawyers, and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws all have supported bifurcated punitive
damages trials.5"
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES SPLIT-RECOVERY LAWS
Our experience has been that the public wants to see egregious conduct
punished, but people feel uneasy about making a particular plaintiff an overnight
millionaire (or billionaire) for acting as a "private attorney general." Reports of
individuals receiving enormous sums of money in lawsuits are one reason why
many in the public have come to view the civil justice system as a "litigation
lottery."51
A number of states have acted to address the "windfall"nature of punitive
damages by requiring a portion of any such recovery to be shared with the state
or directed to a state fund. 2 Split-recovery laws may be driven by other
considerations as well. For example, some legislators may view punitive
damages awards as a convenient revenue raiser, much like an income tax."
Indeed, such laws may be politically popular given the fact that most punitive
damages "revenue" is likely to be paid by out-of-state corporate defendants."'
48. See Hodges v. S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992); Transp.
Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 (Tex. 1994).
49. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295(d) (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20
(West 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1) (1972).
50. See MODEL ACT, supra note 37, at § 11; ALl REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note
37, at 255 n.41; ACTL Report, supranote 37, at 18-19; ABA Report, supranote 37, at
19.
51. See generally CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS 9 (2002).
52. See generally Douglas McCollam, DamagingJustice, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31,
2002, at A 18 (advocating the adoption of split-recovery statutes that fund indigent
defender programs coupled with a contingency fee limit for punitive damages recoveries).

53. See McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(stating that one of the purposes of Georgia's split-recovery statute was the
"governmental interest in generating revenue").
54. See Eric Hellend & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect ofElectoralInstitutionson
Tort Awards, 4 AM. L. & EcoN. REV. 341 (2002) (empirical study suggesting that partisan
elected judges have an incentive to distribute wealth from out-of-state defendants to instate plaintiffs); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Hellend, Court Politics: The Political
Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & EcON. 157 (1999) (empirical study indicating that
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Others may believe that the number of punitive damages awards will go down
if the monetary incentive to pursue such claims is reduced. Some legislators,
therefore, may see punitive damages split-recovery laws as helpful "tort
reform."55
Currently, eight states-Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri,
Oregon, and Utah-require plaintiffs to share punitive damages awards with the
state.56 The Ohio Supreme Court recently stated that it will decide on a case-bycase basis whether to order a portion of any punitive damages award to be
directed to "a place that will achieve a societal good."57 Five other states had
similar requirements that expired by their 58own terms, were declared
unconstitutional, or were otherwise abandoned.

civil awards are higher in states when the defendant is an out-of-state business, especially
in states where judges are elected); see also infra note 84.
55. See McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1570 (describing Georgia's split-recovery law as
"a thinly disguised arbitrary restraint in favor of business seeking to deter punitive
damage actions against egregious business practices by reducing incentives for injured
plaintiffs to take action to punish and deter such practices"); see also Gordon v. State,
608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992) (recognizing that one purpose of Florida's split-recovery

statute was to discourage punitive damage claims); Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d
1080, 1084 (Fla. 1987) (describing the purpose of Florida's 1986 Tort Reform and
Insurance Act, of which the split-recovery statute was a part, as addressing the rising cost
of liability insurance).
56. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0200) (Michie 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-125.1 (e)(2) (2000) (applies onlyto product liability cases); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/21207 (West Supp. 2003); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998); IOWA CODE ANN. §
668A.1(2)(b) (West 1998); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(2) (2002); OR. REV. STAT. §
18.540(1) (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (2002).
57. See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 146
(Ohio 2002). Dardingerinvolved a bad faith claim against a health insurer alleging that

its failure to timely pay a claim of a person with brain cancer ultimately led to the
plaintiff dying sooner and more painfully than had she been able to pay for the requested
treatment. See id. at 131. The jury awarded $49 million in punitive damages, which,
even after the Ohio Supreme Court remitted to $30 million, was the largest verdict in
Ohio history. The Ohio Supreme Court then distributed $10 million of the $30 million
award to the plaintiff and ordered the distribution of the remaining $20 million, after
payment of attorney fees and court costs, to a cancer research fund at Ohio State
University established in the plaintiff's name. See id. at 146. Chief Justice Moyer issued
a strong dissent regarding the majority's "unprecedented alternative distribution of
punitive damages," which he found "fraught with unintended and undesirable
consequences." Id. at 147 (Moyer, C.J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); see also
Victor E. Schwartz, Ohio Court Overreaches,USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 2003, at IOA (noting

that the court's decision trespasses on the legislative role and arguing in opposition to
split-recovery laws).
58. A New York law requiring sharing of awards expired in 1994. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 8703 (expired 1994). A Florida law "sunset" in 1995. See Act effective July
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A. Differences Between Split-Recovery Statutes
1. Percentage to the State
State split-recovery statutes vary widely in the percentage of a punitive
damages award that the plaintiff must share with the state or a state-established
fund. Georgia, Indiana, and Iowa take seventy-five percent of a plaintiff's
punitive damages award.59 Oregon takes sixty percent.6" Alaska, Missouri, and
Utah provide for a fifty-fifty split of the award between the plaintiff and the state
after subtraction of attorney fees and costs. 6 Illinois provides its judges with
discretion to decide how much of a punitive damages award should be directed
to the state.62
2. Allocation to the General Treasury or to a Specific Fund
Split-recovery statutes also vary in the public purpose that they are designed
to support. Three states-Alaska, Georgia, and Utah--deposit their share of
punitive damages awards into a large pot known as the "general fund." 61 In these
states, punitive damages awards are not earmarked for any particular purpose,
but rather provide a new revenue source for the state treasury.
Several other states deposit their portion of punitive damages awards into
a fund designated to further a particular social good. For example, Iowa deposits
its bounty into a "Civil Reparations Trust Fund" administered by the state court
administrator for indigent civil litigation programs or insurance assistance
programs if the defendant's conduct was not directed specifically at the
1, 1995, ch. 92-85, § 3, 1992 Fla. Laws 821, 822 (providing repealer clause for FLA.
STAT. § 768.73). A Kansas split-recovery law applicable only to medical malpractice
cases expired in 1989. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (expired 1989). A splitrecovery law in Colorado has been declared uncofistitutional. See Kirk v. Denver Publ'g
Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991). For a short time, the Alabama Supreme Court required
the splitting of punitive damages awards with the state or a state fund. See Life Ins. Co.
of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685 (Ala.), vacated by 519 U.S. 923 (1996). However, the
court reconsidered and abandoned this policy following the United States Supreme
Court's decision in BMWofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). See Life
Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1997).
59. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000) (applies only to product liability
cases); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1998).
60. See OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(b) (2001).
61. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0200) (Michie 2002); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.675(2)
(2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (2002) (fifty percent of punitive damages in
excess of $20,000).
62. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 2003).
63. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(j) (Michie 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-125.1 (e)(2) (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (2002).
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plaintiff.64 Missouri places punitive damages awards receipts into a "Tort
Victims' Compensation Fund," which provides compensation to individuals who
have sustained personal injuries and are unable to collect the full amount of a
judgment.65 Missouri further allocates twenty-six percent of the "Tort Victims'
Compensation Fund" to a "Legal Services for Low-Income People Fund" that is
distributed among legal service organizations.66 Oregon provides for the
allocation of award money to a "Criminal Injuries Compensation Account"
which provides eligible crime victims and their survivors with medical and
hospital expenses, counseling expenses, loss of earnings, rehabilitation, and
funeral expenses." Indiana's punitive damages allocation statute provides that
an award of punitive damages is to be paid to the clerk of the court, and the clerk
is to pay seventy-five percent of it to the state's "Violent Crime Victims'
Compensation Fund" and twenty-five percent to the plaintiff. 8 Illinois sends its
allocation of punitive damages awards to the State Department of Human
Services.69 In a case alleging a health insurance company's bad faith denial of
a claim related to the plaintiffs cancer treatment, the Ohio Supreme Court
ordered the distribution of two-thirds of the punitive damages award into a
cancer research fund at a state institution. 70
3. Calculation of the Attorney's Contingency Fee
Split-recovery statutes also differ in how the prevailing contingency fee
attorney computes his or her fee. Most states have chosen to protect an
attorney's compensation and incentive to sue by permitting an attorney to receive
a contingency fee based on the gross punitive damages award.71 As former
Alabama Supreme Court Justice Janie Shores advocated, "The plaintiffs
attorney should be awarded a fee from the punitive damages award based upon
the full amount of the jury's verdict, because it is through the attorney's efforts
that the general public has benefitted by the jury's action."' 72 By way of contrast,
Oregon requires any contingency fee to be paid solely out of the plaintiff's share

64. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.I(2)(b) (West 1998).
65. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 537.675(1)(6), 537.675(2) (2002).

66. Id. § 537.675(5).
67. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 18.540(1)(b), 147.005-147.365 (2001).

68. See IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998).
69. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 2003).
70. See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 146
(Ohio 2002).
71. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.080 (Michie 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-125.1(e)(2) (2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1998); Mo. REV. STAT.
§537.675(3) (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (2002).
72. Justice Janie L. Shores, A Suggestionfor Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of
Punitive DamageAwards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REv. 61, 92 (1992).
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of the punitive damages award and further limits the contingency fee to no more
than twenty percent of that amount."
V. SPLIT-RECOVERY LAWS POSE NUMEROUS PROBLEMS
Statutes requiring the plaintiff to share punitive damages with the state may
have a superficial appeal to state legislators for the reasons stated earlier in this
Article. Such laws, however, come with their own set of problems. As
explained below, split-recovery statutes may exacerbate the problem of runaway
punitive damages, may introduce prejudice into civil trials, and are socially,
ethically, and constitutionally problematic.
A. Punitive DamagesSharingLaws May Fuel the Problem of
Runaway Awards
Our experience has been that state legislators are often drawn to splitrecovery statutes because they believe such laws may curb excessive punitive
damages awards. Many legislators, therefore, may be surprised to learn that
these laws can actually bring about the opposite result. In practice, such laws
may worsen, rather the curb, the problem of punitive damages "run wild."74
1. Addressing the "Windfall" Nature of Punitive Damages May Result
in Larger Awards
In the absence of a split-recovery statute, jurors may be tempered in
awarding large punitive damages awards because they are uncomfortable with
giving a single successful plaintiff an enormous windfall. As the American
College of Trial Lawyers questioned, "Does the fact that a punitive award is a
'windfall' of sorts currently cause the jury, on occasion, to limit the award to an
amount smaller than might otherwise be awarded? '75 Split-recovery statutes may
undermine this tempering effect and embolden jurors to award even larger
recoveries than they do today.
2. States May Become Reliant on Punitive Damages Awards
for Revenue
Another major problem with split-recovery laws is that they may lead states
to become more reliant on punitive damages to either supplement the state

73. See OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(l)(a) (2001).
74. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
75. ACTL Report, supra note 37, at 20.
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treasury or to fund social programs. This reliance could encourage states to
expand the availability of punitive damages awards or to undertake policies that
promote such awards.
For example, attorneys general, agencies, or departments in states with splitrecovery laws might be expected to file more amicus curiae briefs favoring
plaintiffs in private disputes. Some of these cases may not implicate any state
interest other than the collection of revenue. For example, in Miele v.
Prudential-BacheSecurities, Inc.,76 the Florida Department of Banking and
Finance argued in an amicus brief to the Florida Supreme Court that Florida's
split-recovery statute should apply to arbitration awards as well as court
judgments." The case involved a private dispute between an investment
company and an account holder. The Department suggested that its
interpretation would further the legislature's goal of discouraging punitive
damages claims by making them less remunerative to the plaintiff and the
plaintiffs attorney.7" Given the Department's statutory role in collecting the
state's share of punitive damages, however, its motive in filing the brief was
transparent. The Department would receive less revenue if the court deemed
arbitration awards to fall outside the split-recovery statute. The Florida Supreme
Court ultimately rejected the Department's approach,79 but the case demonstrates
that states will aggressively seek to promote their interest in receiving punitive
damages "revenue."
One might expect some state executives to become even more aggressive
in their "tax collector" role. Rather than simply filing an amicus brief in support
of a plaintiff in a punitive damages case and relying on the skill or experience of
a private attorney to obtain a judgment, state executives may seek to intervene
directly in private lawsuits, bringing the resources and experience of the state to
bear in a case. Such direct state involvement would significantly change the
dynamics of civil litigation and would have a serious adverse effect on
defendants, not only with respect to the issue of punitive damages, but also to the
basic issue of compensatory damages liability.
Currently, most split-recovery statutes do not give the state the power to
intervene in private litigation, ° but those laws can be amended and similar

76. 656 So. 2d 470, 473 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam).
77. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Dept. of Banking and Finance, Miele v. PrudentialBache Sec., Inc., Case No. 81,467 (filed May 27, 1993) (on file with authors).
78. See id. at 2.
79. See Miele, 656 So. 2d at 473.
80. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0200) (Michie 2002) ("This subsection does
not grant the state the right to file or join a civil action to recover punitive damages.");
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000) ("This paragraph shall not be construed as
making the state a party at interest and the sole right of the state is to the proceeds as
provided in this paragraph."); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675(4) (2002) ("The state of
Missouri shall have no interest in or right to intervene at any stage of any judicial
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language may be left out of future enactments. Sooner or later, state executives
may seek legislative authority to intervene in private litigation for the purpose of
representing the state's interest in a punitive damages recovery, and they may get
it-particularly since the targets of state involvement invariably will be out-ofstate corporate defendants. 8
3. Judges May Be Influenced to Rule Against Certain Defendants
Split-recovery laws also may encourage courts to expand the availability of
punitive damages awards or to sustain enormous punitive damages awards on
appeal in order to promote local state interests at the expense of out-of-state or
otherwise unpopular defendants. Most state trial judges in this country are
elected. 2 Although commentators often observe that "judges are different" than
those elected to executive or legislative offices,83 the fact remains that as elected
officials, state court judges must have some degree of responsiveness to the
voters who elect them or they will be voted off the bench.
Judges are called upon to make pretrial and evidentiary rulings and approve
jury instructions that may impact the outcome of a case, including the availability
and size of a punitive damages award. Research suggests that elected judges
may favor in-state plaintiffs, who vote and have friends and relatives who vote,
over out-of-state corporations. 4 Split-recovery statutes provide further potential

proceeding pursuant to this section, except to enforce its lien rights.").
81. See Victor E. Schwartz, TheRemoteness Doctrine: A RationaleForaRational
Limit on Tort Liability, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 759, 767 (2000) (noting that in the state
attorneys general litigation against the tobacco industry, Florida, Maryland, and Vermont

passed statutes to amend the common law to give the states a direct cause of action);
Victor E. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine: A Rational Limit on Tort Law, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 438 (1999) (noting the same).
82. See generally Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting
Appointive JudicialSelection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 273, 314-60 (2002) (providing detailed summary ofthejudicial selection methods

in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia).
83. See, e.g., David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial
Elections Unique?, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (2001).
84. See John L. Dodd et al., The Federalist Soc'y, White Paper: The Case for
Judicial Appointments,
available at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/White%20Papers/judicialappointments.htm (last visited Aug. 11,
2003). One reason for the bias against out-of-state businesses was stated by elected
Justice Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. He explained:
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to
in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced
when I give someone else's money away, but so is my job security, because
the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their friends will reelect me.
Id.; see also Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897,905 (W. Va. 1991) ("State
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for judicial bias. Even the most well-intentioned judge may find a large punitive
damages verdict easier to accept if the judge knows that the award will help
reduce the tax burden on voters in his or her county or support a "good cause."
4. Split-Recovery Laws Do Not Result in Fewer
Punitive Damages Claims
Some legislators may appreciate that split-recovery laws create the potential
for larger awards, but believe that threat is offset by the possibility that lawyers
will pursue punitive damages in fewer cases." In sum, they may believe the
"good" outweighs the "bad." As a practical matter, however, this is not true.
The only way to reduce the number of punitive damages claims is to reduce the
monetary incentive to pursue them, and that rarely occurs. As explained above,
most split-recovery laws provide for contingency fee attorneys to be paid based
on the full amount of the award, before any subtraction for the state's share.
Thus, the monetary incentive for attorneys to pursue such claims is preserved.
As long as attorneys are permitted to receive large contingency fees from
punitive damages awards, the problematic trends in punitive damages will
continue.
Efforts to abolish contingency fee recoveries for punitive damages
judgments have not been successful as a political matter and may not be
desirable as a policy matter.8 6 Totally removing the incentive to seek punitive
damages for egregious and intentional wrongdoing could, in effect, immunize
such misconduct from punishment. Once legislators appreciate this fact they

courts have adopted standards that are, for the most part, not predictable, not consistent
and not uniform. Such fuzzy standards inevitably are most likely to be applied arbitrarily
against out-of-state defendants."); Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781,
786 (W. Va. 1991) ("[W]e do not claim that our adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs
comports, necessarily, with some Platonic ideal of perfectjustice. Rather, for a tiny state
incapable of controlling the direction of national law in terms of appropriate trade-offs
among employment, research, development, and compensation for the injured users of
products, the adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs is simple self-defense."). There is
evidence to support bias of elected judges against out-of-state corporations, a category
of defendants already unpopular with juries. A recent study found that tort awards
against out-of-state defendants in states with elected judiciaries were approximately
$365,000 above average, while awards in states with appointed judiciaries were
approximately $220,000 above average. See Dodd et al., supra note 84.
85. See Patrick White, Note, The PracticalEffects of Split-Recovery Statutes and
Their Validity as a Tool of Modern Day "Tort Reform ", 50 DRAKE L. REv. 593, 609
(2002).
86. See ALl REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 37, at 259 n.49 ("If the plaintiff (or
rather the plaintiff s attorney) will not collect the benefits from the effort to establish the
stiffer legal grounds for punitive damages, the case for such damages will not likely be
made.").
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generally decide to allow contingency fees to be recovered in punitive damages
cases, and the mechanism that would result in fewer claims is lost.
B. Split-Recovery Laws May Foster "Regulation Through Litigation"
The state attorneys general Medicaid recoupment litigation against the
tobacco industry was the genesis of a new trend that former Clinton
Administration Secretary of Labor Robert Reich called "regulation through
litigation."87 Secretary Reich was describing a willingness by some state
executives to use the threat of massive liability exposure to force behavioral
changes in an entire industry.8" The trend is built upon a powerful new alliance
between state executives and politically influential personal injury lawyers. 9
In the state attorneys general tobacco litigation, the partnership between
state executives and private personal injury lawyers was unprecedented,
powerful, and lucrative. Ultimately, the litigation resulted in a global settlement
which included $248 billion in damages and $8.2 billion in fees for the private
attorneys-most of whom worked on a contingent fee basis.9" That cash will
undoubtedly help finance new contingency fee projects. It also may be used to
finance the political campaigns of candidates who may hire the lawyers to bring
new cases in the future. 91
Evidence of "regulation through litigation" can be found all across the
nation. Local governments have hired private attorneys to sue gun manufacturers
in a number of cities. 92 Rhode Island retained a well-known plaintiffs' firm to
assist in an effort to hold former manufacturers of lead paint liable for

87. Robert B. Reich, Regulation is Out, Litigation is In, USA TODAY, Feb. 11,

1999, at 15A ("The era of big government may be over, but the era of regulation through
litigation has just begun."). Secretary Reich later observed, "The strategy may work, but
at the cost of making our frail democracy even weaker.... This is faux legislation, which

sacrifices democracy to the discretion of administration officials operating in secrecy."
Robert B. Reich, Don't DemocratsBelieve in Democracy?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2000,

at A22.
88. See Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of
Powers in State Governments: Repairingthe Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 563
(2001); William H. Pryor, Jr., Comment, Tort Liability, the StructuralConstitutionand
the States, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 604 (2001).
89. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Tort Reform Past,PresentandFuture: Solving
OldProblemsand Dealing With "New Style "Litigation, 27 WM. MITCHELLL. REV. 237,
255-57 (2000).
90. See Elaine McArdle, Trial Lawyers, AGs Creating a New Branch of
Government, LAW. WKLY. USA, July 12, 1999, at B3.
91. See Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle Tedesco, Addressing Regulation Through
Litigation: Some Solutions to Government SponsoredLawsuits, 3 ENGAGE 109 (2002).
92. See Jeff Reh, Social Issue Litigation and the Route Around Democracy, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515 (2000).
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government healthcare costs. 93 Other states are reportedly considering similar
actions.94 Several local governments have filed or plan to file their own lead
paint lawsuits.95 Rhode Island's attorney general even suggested that "going
after the latex rubber industry" could recoup "a couple of billion dollars." 96
The list may not stop there. Part of the 1998 tobacco settlement included
a payment of $50 million into an enforcement fund to be used by the National
Association of Attorneys General.97 While this payment might not be used to
fund litigation against other industries, it provides a strong incentive for state
attorneys general to attempt to repeat their success with the tobacco litigation.
In fact, in June of 1999, fifty state attorneys general held a strategy session to
discuss future targets.9 " Reports suggest that these targets could include health
insurers, manufacturers of automobiles, chemicals, alcoholic beverages, and
pharmaceuticals, Internet providers, "Hollywood," video games, and the casino
gaming industry.99

Even producers of fatty foods face the challenge of

regulation by litigation."'0

93. See Milo Geyelin, MistrialDeclaredin Landmark Lead-PaintSuit, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 30, 2002, at D2.
94. See Robert A. Levy, Turning Lead Into Gold, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at
21; see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr., StateMedicalReimbursement LawsuitsAfter Tobacco:
Is the Domino Effect for Lead PaintManufacturersandOthers FairGame?, 27 PEPP. L.
REv. 685, 691 (2000).
95. See Scott Winokur, S.F., OaklandJoin Suit Over Lead Paint/RedressSought
for Health Costs, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2001, at BI; Greg Borowski, Council Oks Lead
PaintLawsuit, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 20, 2000, at B 1; Norm Parish, City's Lead
Paint Suit Is Almost Identicalto One in Rhode Island; Team Handling That Case Was
Rejected Here; Harmon Selected More Costly Firm, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24,
2000, at B 1.
96. Letter from Rhode Island Attorney General Sheldon Whitehouse, to Idaho
Attorney General Alan G. Lance (Aug. 27, 1999) (on file with authors).
97. See Samuel Goldreich, SmallFarmersStandAgainstBig Tobacco's Settlement:
$246 Billion Deal Burns Independent Growers, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at D 11.
98. See Mark Curriden, Fresh Off Tobacco Success, State AGs Seek Next Battle;
United FrontPuts Businesses on the Defensive, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 10, 1999,
at lA.
99. See John Fund & Martin Morse Wooster, The DangersofRegulation Through
Litigation: TheAlliance ofPlaintiffs'Lawyersand State Governments (Am. Tort Reform
Found., 2000); Schwartz et al., supranote 4. See generallyVictor E. Schwartz, Pushing
Regulation Through Litigation to the Edge: The Gaming Industry, Fast Food and
Alcoholic Beverages, 4 ALEC POL'Y FORUM 54 (Summer/Fall 2002), available at
http://www.alec.org/meSWFiles/pdf/APFSummerFall02.pdf.
100. See John Berlau, Big FoodFight,INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, June 15, 2002, at 2;
Shelly Branch, As Obesity ConcernsMount, CompaniesFret Their Snacks, Drinks May
Take the Blame, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2002, at B1; Lance Gay, Is There a 'Fat Tax'in
Your Future? Could be, Experts Say; Obesity to Blame, but Food Industry Scoffs,
SEATTLE

POST-INTELLIGENCER,

Apr.

30,

2002,

available at
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Split-recovery statutes provide new potential for regulation by litigation.
As explained, such laws create incentives for state executives to become more
engaged in private litigation for the purpose of representing the state's interest
in punitive damages "revenue."'' The more state executives and plaintiffs'
lawyers work together in litigation, the more likely it is that bonds will be formed
that may result in new litigation-when you put matches and fuel together, you
are more likely to get fire.
C. Split-Recovery Laws Can Create Conflicts of Interest
Between Plaintiffs'Lawyersand Their Clients
"There is an inherent conflict between lawyers and their clients when
entering into fee agreements."' 2 A plaintiffs attorney who enters into a
contingency fee agreement with a client has, in effect, purchased a portion of the
client's cause of action. In return for being granted one-third to one-half of the
claim, the lawyer agrees to perform legal services without charge and, in some
cases, to advance out-of-pocket costs. The interests of a lawyer who has
purchased a share of her client's cause of action will inevitably clash with the
client's own interests. In his book, The LitigationExplosion: What Happened
When America UnleashedtheLawsuit, Manhattan Institute scholar Walter Olson
explains how this happens: once a lawyer has invested the time and money in

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/68445_fattax30.shtml.
101. For example, a bill introduced in the Utah legislature during the 2002 session
would have required a plaintiff to notify the state attorney general of a request for

punitive damages within seven days of trial. See S.B. 141,54th Leg. (Utah 2002). If the
plaintiff failed to provide this notice, then he or she would have been prohibited from

receiving a punitive damages award. The bill also would have required the clerk of the
court to notify the state treasurer of any punitive damages award over $20,000 and
provided that the treasurer may request the attorney general's assistance in collecting the

state portion. See id. In what may have been its most unusual provision, the Utah bill
required that "[a]ny settlement reached by the parties after the notice [of arequest for
punitive damages seven days prior to trial] is given shall require the attorney general's
or court's approval." Id. This provision would have involved the attorney general in
settlement decisions between private parties in an effort to protect the state's share of a

punitive award. Although a substitute bill, which was enacted into law, provided only
that the court must notify the attorney general and state treasurer immediately upon a
punitive damages verdict and again within five days of the entry ofjudgment, the intent
of the bill as introduced is unmistakable. It sought to increase the attorney general's
involvement in private litigation for the purpose of regulating conduct and generating

revenue for the state.
102. Victor E.Schwartz et al., ConsumerProtectionin the Legal Marketplace: A
Legal Consumer's Bill of Rights Is Needed, 15 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 1, 11 (2003).
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a lawsuit, the lawyer has a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation and the
client is no longer solely in control.'0°
State split-recovery statutes broaden this conflict by pitting lawyer against
client in deciding whether or not to settle a case or go to trial. In many cases, it
may be in the best interest of the plaintiff to settle the case to ensure at least some
recovery for his or her harm. Furthermore, in a state with a split-recovery law,
settlement may be particularly appropriate for plaintiffs because any settlement
amount that reflects the "shadow effect" of punitive damages would be kept by
the plaintiff and not shared with the state.'0 4
The contingency fee attorney's incentives may be altogether different,
because most split-recovery laws protect an attorney's right to receive his or her
contingency fee based on the gross amount of the punitive damages award, rather
than just the portion allocated to the plaintiff. In other words, the lawyer, unlike
the plaintiff, does not have to share any portion of his or her share of the punitive
damages award with the state. Such laws may make the lawyer the primary
beneficiary of any punitive damages recovery. This may encourage some
lawyers to counsel their clients to proceed to trial when a settlement might be in
the client's best interest. As a report published by the prestigious American Law
Institute (ALI) explained, "allowing the plaintiff's attorney some contingent
share of the state's award creates a potential conflict with the interests of the
"We
plaintiff."' °5 For this reason, the reporters for the ALI project concluded:
06
are not in favor, then, of paying punitive damages to the state."'1
D. Allocation of Punitive DamagesMay Prejudice the Jury
Punitive damages split-recovery laws also may inject an irrelevant factor
into the jury's determination of liability and damages. Juries may render inflated
awards or provide for an unwarranted punitive award for reasons that have
nothing to do with the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. For example,
jurors may be influenced by charitable instinct to fulfill a social good, or their
own self-interest in balancing the state budget on the back of an out-of-state
corporate defendant." 7

103. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN

AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 41-43 (1991).

104. As Yale law professor George Priest has observed: "[T]he availability of
unlimited punitive damages affects the 95% to 98% of cases that settle out of court prior
to trial. It is obvious and indisputable that a punitive damages claim increases the
magnitude of the ultimate settlement and, indeed, affects the entire settlement process."
George L. Priest, Punitive DamagesReform: The CaseofAlabama, 56 LA. L. REV. 825,

830 (1996).
105. ALI REPORTERS'
106. ALI REPORTERS'

STUDY,
STUDY,

supra note 37, at 259 n.49.
supra note 37, at 259 n.49.

107. See ACTL Report, supra note 37, at 20 ("If [the punitive damage award] is
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Recognizing the unfairness of such a situation, every appellate court that
has considered whether it was error for a trial court to provide an instruction to
the jury explaining the allocation of the punitive damages award has required a
new trial. °8 Likewise, an attorney's reference to the allocation of punitive
damages to the state during a closing argument has also been found to be cause
for a mistrial."0 9
The Oregon Supreme Court was the first to consider the issue. In
Honeywell v. SterlingFurnitureCo.,"' the trial court instructed the jury, over the
defendant's objection, that a portion of any punitive damages award would be
paid to the state's "Criminal Injury Compensation Account.""' The Oregon
Supreme Court found this instruction to be a reversible error, holding that:
[I]nstructing a jury that a portion of any punitive damage award will
be used to pay the plaintiffs attorney or to contribute to a worthy
cause, such as help for victims of crime, does nothing to further or
even to inform the jury as to the proper goals of punitive damage
awards. Instead, the instruction distracts the jury from the appropriate
line of analysis that this Court has said a jury should follow in cases
involving potential awards of punitive damages: ... deterring future
similar misconduct by the defendant or others." 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached the same
conclusion in a strict product liability action applying Iowa law.' In Burke v.
Deere & Co., the plaintiff was awarded $650,000 in compensatory damages and
$50 million in punitive damages against Deere for injuries sustained when an
auger on a combine cut his hand."' The trial court provided the jury with a
verdict form, over the defendant's objection, that stated, "if your answer to [a
question regarding whether the conduct was directed at the plaintiff] is no, a
portion of the punitive damages award to be fixed by the court will be paid into
a civil trust fund administered by this court.""' To make matters worse, the

distributed to an authority which levies taxes, willjurors see an opportunity to relieve the
taxpayer of the burden?").
108. See Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 512 (8th Cir. 1993); Ford v. Uniroyal
Goodrich Tire Co., 476 S.E.2d 565,570 (Ga. 1996); Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co.,
797 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Or. 1990).
109. See Burke, 6 F.3d at 513.
110. 797 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1990).
111. See id.
at 1021-22.
112. Id.
(quoting State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 618 P.2d 1268, 1274 (1980))
(internal quotations omitted).
113. SeeBurke,6F.3d at 501.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 512 (alterations in original).
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plaintiff's attorney instructed the jury during closing argument that seventy-five
percent of the punitive damages award "will go into a civil trust fund to help
prevent this sort of thing in a different way and that 75 percent will go into a
special fund, a special trust fund, to be administered by the courts for others
than Burke.""' 6
The Eighth Circuit ruled that the court's instruction and the plaintiffs
closing statement prejudiced the jury." 7 The court found that "the size of the
verdict leads us to conclude that the jury indeed sought to create some sort of
injury fund or to improperly engage in a social reallocation of resources for the
benefit of parties not properly before the court."" ' Because of this and other
errors, the court ordered the entire case to be retried." 9
The Georgia Supreme Court has also concluded that a jury instruction
informing jurors about the allocation of punitive damages to the state required
a new trial, but for a different reason. In Fordv. UniroyalGoodrich Tire Co.,2

involving separate product liability actions by parents and their child against a
tire manufacturer for injuries they received when a car with allegedly defective
tires hit their stalled van, a Georgia trial court instructed the jury in the child's
case that Georgia law provides that seventy-five percent of any amount awarded
as punitive damages, less a proportionate part of the costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be paid into the state treasury. 2' Following this
instruction, the jury returned a $25 million punitive damages verdict against the
defendant.' 22 The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that this instruction constituted
reversible error, not because of the bias caused by the instruction's appeal to the
jurors' charitable instincts, but because the instruction improperly focused the
jury on the plaintiffs compensation rather than the defendant's conduct:
As the [punitive damage] statute repeatedly states, the purpose of
punitive damages is to punish and deter the defendant, not to
compensate the victim. As we have previously stated, the 75-percent
allocation rule was enacted to fulfill this purpose, not to generate
additional state revenue. Given the unquestioned purpose of the
punitive damage statute, the sole issue for a jury is the amount of
money necessary to punish the defendant and deter future misconduct.
Therefore, it is irrelevant who will be compensated by the award or
how much the plaintiff will ultimately receive. By instructing the jury
on the statutory scheme for allocating a punitive damages award, the
116. Id. at 513 (quoting transcript) (internal quotations omitted).
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 513-14.

120. 476 S.E.2d 565 (Ga. 1996).
121. See id. at 567.
122. See id.
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trial court improperly shifted the jury's focus from the critical question
of the defendant's conduct to the inappropriate question of the
plaintiff's compensation.' 23
These cases make clear that split-recovery statutes pose special problems
for courts that must be addressed in order to prevent jurors from meting out
punishment based on irrelevant considerations.
E. Split-Recovery Statutes May FosterDue Process Challenges
Jury instructions that purport to focus the jury on the defendant's conduct
may not be enough to cure the problem of irrelevant considerations infecting
punitive damages awards in states with split-recovery statutes. Regardless of the
instruction given at trial, jurors in states with split-recovery laws are likely to
know that their decision to award punitive damages will supplement the state
treasury or fulfill a socially laudable goal. Jurors should not be presumed to be
ignorant of the law. The potential prejudice to defendants created by such laws
may give rise to due process challenges.
1. Background on United States Supreme Court
Punitive Damages Jurisprudence
For over a decade, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized its
concern that punitive damages awards should not be assessed in an arbitrary or
24 the Court
capricious fashion. In PacificMutual Life InsuranceCo. v. Haslip,"'
acknowledged that excessive punitive damages awards could violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Court held that the
award in that particular case did not violate due process.12 In a subsequent case,
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 126 a plurality of the Court
held for the first time that "grossly excessive" punitive damages awards violate
due process, but declined to adopt a bright-line test for making such a
determination.2 7
123. Id. at 570.
124. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).

125. Id. at 18.
126. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
127. See id. at 455-56; cf Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., 72 F.3d 648,661 (8th Cir. 1995)
(opinion by former Supreme Court Justice White, striking down punitive damages award
as "excessive, unreasonable and violative of due process"). In a dissenting opinion in
TXO, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Souter, noted that the Court's

decision provided "not a single guidepost to help other courts find their way through this
area." TXO, 509 U.S. at 480 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissenting justices
suggested that the Court should consider adopting objective factors by which to judge
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Three years after TXO, the Court granted certiorari in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore' in order to "help to illuminate 'the character of the
standard that will identify unconstitutionally excessive awards."" '29 The Gore
Court offered three "guideposts" for determining whether a punitive damages
award is "unconstitutionally excessive." 13' First, "[p]erhaps the most important
indicium [of the appropriateness of the] award is the degree of reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct."'' Second, the most commonly cited indicium of
the reasonableness of the punitive damages award is the ratio of actual damages
to punitive damages.' 32 The third factor is a comparison to "civil or criminal
1' 33
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.'
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group Inc.," the Court
reaffirmed Gore, and provided lower courts with additional guidance for
reviewing punitive damages awards. 135 The Court held that appellate courts must
engage in de novo review of punitive damages awards to determine if an award
is unconstitutionally excessive.' 36
Most recently, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell,'37 the Court held that punitive damages may not be imposed to punish
a defendant for out-of-state conduct and provided a presumption that single digit
multipliers of the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages 38are more
likely to comport with due process than those with greater disparity.
This jurisprudence invites two distinct due process challenges to punitive
damages awards in states with split-recovery laws. The first potential challenge
is that a jury's decision to impose punitive damages was based upon bias or
prejudice resulting from the split-recovery law (e.g., the jurors' desire to levy
punitive damages against an out-of-state or unpopular industry as a form of "tax
relief' or to fund a social program). A second, related challenge is that the
amount of the punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive because
it is the product of considerations unrelated to the defendant's conduct.

whether punitive damages awards are unconstitutionally excessive. See id. at 475-83.
128. 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (quoting Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,
420 (1994)).

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 568.
Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 583.

134. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).

135. See id. at 433.
136. See id.
137. 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
138. See id.
at 1516.
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2. Punitive Damages Awards Influenced by Bias or Prejudice Violate
Due Process
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that punitive
damages awards infected with bias, passion, or prejudice violate constitutional
due process. In TXO, for example, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated: "When a
punitive damages award reflects bias, passion, or prejudice on the part of the
jury, rather than a rational concern for deterrence and retribution, the
Constitution has been violated, no matter what the absolute or relative size of the
award."' 39 Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Byron White, and David Souter
likewise noted: "Influences such as caprice, passion, bias, and prejudice are
antithetical to the rule of law. If there is a fixture of due process, it is that a
verdict based on such influences cannot stand."' 40 The Court reaffirmed this
fundamental principle in Gore when it held that a punitive damages award based
on conduct unrelated to the plaintiff's harm enters the "zone of arbitrariness" that
violates due process. 4 '
Split-recovery laws provide the jury with a motive for awarding punitive
damages other than for punishment or deterrence. The opportunity to require an
out-of-state defendant to "take a load off' local taxpayers or to fulfill socially
beneficial goals may be a powerful and attractive incentive for a jury to impose
a punitive damages award when not necessitated by the defendant's conduct.
This is not to say that jurors are mischievous or scheming; their motivations
simply may reflect human nature. Nevertheless, such motivations reflect a bias
that may result in a due process violation.
3. Excessive Punitive Damages Awards Violate Due Process
Split-recovery laws also may foster due process challenges asserting that a
punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive. As explained above, the
Gore Court set forth three "guideposts" for determining whether punitive awards
are unconstitutionally excessive: reprehensibility, ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages, and comparable civil or criminal penalties.'42 Each of
these guideposts flows from the wrong done to the plaintiff. Accordingly, if it
appears that the jury may have been influenced by other factors, such as the

139. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,467 (1993) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 41 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("A verdict
returned by a biased or prejudiced jury no doubt violates due process.").
140. TXO, 509 U.S. at 475-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
142. See id. at 575.
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desire to fulfill a particular social good through an award of punitive damages,
the award should be deemed unconstitutional.
4. Courts Should Raise a Suspicious Judicial Eyebrow When
Examining Punitive Damages Awards in States
With Split-Recovery Statutes
The existence of a split-recovery law, coupled with a large punitive
damages award, should raise a "suspicious judicial eyebrow" that the jury may
have awarded punitive damages for improper purposes, or decided upon an
inflated award for the same reasons.'43 Jury awards based wholly or in part on

the potential good that might come out of redistributing wealth to public
programs or social causes should be struck down as violating due process.
It may be particularly difficult for courts to assess the legitimate portion of
a punitive damages award meant to punish or deter intentional or egregious bad
conduct from the constitutionally questionable portion that may be awarded for
the improper purpose of funding government programs or services.'" \"But
fundamental fairness requires that impermissible influences such as bias and
prejudice be discovered nonetheless, by inference if not by direct proof."'4 5
Courts in states with split-recovery laws must closely scrutinize punitive
damages awards to make sure that punishment was meted out for the right
reasons and in an amount appropriate under the circumstances. Legislators also
should appreciate that split-recovery laws may complicate judicial review of
punitive damages, foster appeals, and increase delays and costs in civil litigation.
F. ConstitutionalQuestions RegardingSplit-Recovery Laws
Statutes requiring successful plaintiffs to surrender a portion of their
punitive damages award to the state not only suffer from practical difficulties,
but also face broad constitutional challenges.'" Aside from due process
implications, split-recovery statutes are most often challenged under the Takings
Clause, as an excessive fine, or as a violation of equal protection under the
United States Constitution or equivalent provisions of state constitutions. Splitrecovery statutes are also subject to challenge under state constitutional

143. TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. See id. at 476 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Of course, determining whether a
verdict resulted from improper influences is no easy matter.").
145. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. See generallyClay R. Stevens, Comment, Split-Recovery: A Constitutional
Answer to the Punitive DamagesDilemma, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 857 (1994); Paul F. Kirgis,
Note, The ConstitutionalityofState Allocation ofPunitive Damage Awards, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 843 (1993).
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protections that do not have a federal corollary. Court decisions regarding the
constitutionality of split-recovery statutes are mixed. Thus far, seven state
supreme courts have upheld such laws, 4 7 and one state supreme court has
declared its state's law to be unconstitutional. 48 A federal district court has also
found a sharing statute unconstitutional, 149 but that state's supreme court
declined to follow the federal decision.' 50
1. Takings Challenges
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government taking of private property
for public use without just compensation. 5' For this reason, the compelled
sharing of punitive damages with the state is most frequently challenged as an
unconstitutional taking of property.'52 These attacks often fail because
longstanding United States Supreme Court precedent provides that property
rights are created by operation of state law. 5 Thus, a plaintiff who wins a
lawsuit does not have a property right in the full punitive damages award if a
statute provides that a portion of the award belongs to the state. 5 4 That plaintiff,
having never received a judgment for the full amount of the punitive damages
award, does not have a "vested" property right for more than his or her share of
the award.'55 As the Georgia Supreme Court recognized, "A plaintiff has no
vested property right in the amount of punitive damages which can be awarded

147. See Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002) (plurality
opinion); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436
S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993); State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993); Cheatham v. Pohle,
789 N.E.2d 467 (Ind.2003); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue &
Assoc., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991); Hoskins v. Bus. Men's Assurance, 79 S.W.3d
901 (Mo. 2002); Fust v. Attorney General, 947 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. 1997); DeMendoza v.
Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232 (Or. 2002).
148. See Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
149. See McBride v. Gen. Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
150. See Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 635; Moseley, 436 S.E.2d at 632.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
152. See Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267-73; Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 639; Cheatham,
789 N.E.2d at 470; Shepherd Components, 473 N.W.2d at 619; Fust,947 S.W.2d at 431.
153. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (stating
that property rights are not created by the United States Constitution, but "[r]ather they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law.").
154. See Hoskins v. Bus. Men's Assurance, 79 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Mo. 2002)
(finding no due process violation where the statute specifies the state's share of the
punitive damages award and the defendant is liable for the full amount of the award
whether or not the state has a lien on a portion of the judgment).
155. See McCollough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898) (noting that the
legislature may not take property rights that have been vested by a judgment).
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in any case, and the legislature may lawfully regulate the amount of punitive
damages which can be awarded."' 56 Moreover, the Indiana Supreme Court has
held, it stands to reason that if it is within a state's discretion to limit or
completely eliminate punitive damages awards, then it may also decide to
allocate a portion of an award to a state fund. 5
Colorado is the only state to invalidate a sharing statute as an
unconstitutional taking.158 That statute, however, was unique in that it operated
to require a claimant to remit a portion of the punitive damages award to the state
after obtaining a judgment.5 Since the claimant had already acquired a vested
right to the property, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled in Kirk v. Denver
PublishingCo., the state could not constitutionally require the claimant to then
surrender a portion of the award to the state.16 ° Most other state statutes avoid
this constitutional infirmity by providing that the claimant and the state acquire
their property interest in the judgment simultaneously upon entrance of the
verdict' 6' or through the court's construing the statutory allocation "as a cap on
punitive damages, limiting them before they are awarded to successful
plaintiffs."' 6
2. Equal Protection
Split-recovery statutes are also frequently challenged under the federal
Equal Protection
Clause and equivalent state protections, such as those barring
"special laws."' 63 The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection
under the laws" means that "[s]tates must treat like cases alike but may treat
unlike cases accordingly."' 64 If a classification "neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class" courts usually will uphold it "so long as it bears

156. Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 639; see also Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800,

801-02 (Fla. 1992) ("The right to have punitive damages assessed is not property; and it
is the general rule that, until judgment is rendered, there is no vested right in a claim for

punitive damages.") (quoting Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1950)); Shepherd
Components, 473 N.W.2d at 619 (stating that "punitive damages are not allowed as a
matter of right and are discretionary").
157. See Cheatham,789 N.E.2d at 472.
158. See Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262, 267-73 (Colo. 1991).
159. See id. at 272.
160. See id. at 273.
161. See Fust v. Attorney General, 947 S.W.2d 424, 431 (Mo. 1997) (comparing

Missouri and Colorado split-recovery statutes); DeMendoza v. Huffinan, 51 P.3d 1232,
1247 (Or. 2002) (comparing Oregon and Colorado split-recovery statutes).
162. Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1058 (Alaska 2002).
163. See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992); Mack Trucks, Inc. v.

Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993); Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 432.
164. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793,799 (1997) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
216 (1982)).
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a rational relation to some legitimate end."'' 6' Equal protection attacks on splitrecovery statutes have not been successful.
For example, in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, a Georgia plaintiff challenged
that state's sharing provision, which applies only to product liability actions, as
arbitrarily discriminating between product liability claimants and other
claimants. 66 The plaintiff, who alleged that he was injured when the tractor
trailer he was driving overturned due to a defect, received a $2 million punitive
damages award. 67 The claimant challenged the Georgia statute on the grounds
that requiring him to give seventy-five percent of his punitive damages award to
the state, but not requiring claimants in other cases to do the same, violated equal
protection. 16 The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed. The court ruled that so
long as similarly situated plaintiffs, such as those involved in product liability
69
actions, are treated the same, the statute does not run afoul of equal protection.
The Missouri Supreme Court addressed a different equal protection
challenge to the Missouri sharing statute in Fust v. Attorney General.' The
Fust claimants argued that the statute unconstitutionally discriminates against
plaintiffs who do not settle because the law only gives the plaintiff a portion of
the punitive damages awarded by a final judgment.' 7' The court upheld the law,
noting that "social and economic legislation [such as the sharing statute] 'that
does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must
be upheld against equal protection attack when the legislative means are
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.""7 2
3. Excessive Fines
Plaintiffs have also challenged split-recovery statutes under the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment."' In a 1989 case, Browning-Ferris

165. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
166. See Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 639; see also James E. Lee II, Note, Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle: The Georgia Supreme Court Tells the Legislature to Keep on
Truckin 'When AppropriatingPunitiveAwards to the State Treasury,45 MERCERL. REV.
1439 (1994).
167. See Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 636-37.
168. See id. at 637-38.
169. See id. at 639.
170. See Fust v. Attorney General, 947 S.W.2d 424, 432 (Mo. 1997). See
generally Benjamin F. Evans, Note, "Split-Recovery" Survives: The MissouriSupreme
Court Upholds the State's Power to Collect One-Halfof Punitive Damage Awards, 63
Mo. L. REv. 511 (1998).
171. See Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 432.
172. Id. (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981)).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, not cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). For historical background
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Industriesof Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,Inc. ,74 the United States Supreme
Court rejected a claim that a $6 million punitive damages award was
unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause.'75 The Court ruled that the
Excessive Fines Clause "appl[ies] primarily, and perhaps exclusively, to criminal
prosecutions and punishments" and its "primary focus" was not concerned with
civil damages.' 76 The Court qualified its ruling, however, noting that the
Excessive Fines Clause "does not constrain an award of money damages in a
civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any
right to receive a share of the damages awarded."'77 The Court's language in
Browning-Ferris invites Eighth Amendment challenges to split-recovery
statutes.'78
A Missouri plaintiff seized upon the Court's invitation in Browning-Ferris
to challenge that state's split-recovery statute.'79 In Hoskins v. Business Men's
Assurance, an engineer who was diagnosed with demoplastic mesothelioma, a
form of cancer associated with asbestos exposure, received a judgment for
compensatory and punitive damages against the owner of the building in which
he had been exposed to asbestos during his employment.'
When the state
asserted its lien for fifty percent of the punitive damages award, Hoskins and his
wife challenged the constitutionality of the statute under various theories,
including the Excessive Fines Clause.' 8' The Missouri Supreme Court held that
because the statute did not implicate the state's prosecutorial power or provide
the state with any interest in the punitive damages award prior to a final
judgment, the statute did not run afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause." 2
Two federal district courts have also evaluated the constitutionality of
sharing provisions under the Excessive Fines Clause and reached opposite
results. In McBride v. GeneralMotors Corp.,' ' a federal district court ruled that
the Georgia statute allocating seventy-five percent of punitive damages awards
to the state's general fund was unconstitutional.' 4 The court reasoned:

on the Excessive Fines Clause, see Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and
Punitive Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1233 (1987).
174. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
175. Id. at 260.
176. Id. at 262, 266.
177. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
178. See Matthew J. Klaben, Note, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the
Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 104 (1994); Recent Case,
Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992), 106 HARV. L. REv. 1691 (1993).
179. See Hoskins v. Bus. Men's Assurance, 79 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Mo. 2002).
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (Ga. 1993).
184. Id. at 1578.
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[T]he [Tort Reform] Act, if the subsection allowing the State of
Georgia to occupy the status of a judgment creditor entitled to 75% of
any award of product liability punitive damages is allowed to stand,
converts the civil nature action of the prior Georgia punitive damages
statute into a statute where fines are being made for the benefit of the
State, contrary to the constitutional prohibitions as to excessive fines
and contrary to the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States.'
In upholding Iowa's sharing statute against a similar challenge, the Southern
District of Iowa distinguished its ruling from McBride. In Burke v. Deere &
Company,'"6 the district court reasoned that the Iowa statute did not impose an
excessive fine because it allocates a portion of the punitive damages award not
to the state treasury, as in Georgia, but to a civil reparations trust fund
administered by the courts.'87 As discussed supra, the Eighth Circuit reversed
the district court because it improperly instructed the jury on the allocation of
punitive damages to the state fund.' 8 Although the court did not reach the
constitutionality of the statute under the Due Process or Excessive Fines Clauses,
the Eighth Circuit expressed some skepticism in dicta, noting that "this may be
the sort of verdict that the Supreme Court has in mind when it referred to
'extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities."" 89
4. Various State Constitutional Provisions
Split-recovery statutes have also survived most challenges based on various
state constitutional provisions, such as "single subject" rules, requirements that

185. Id. The district court also ruled that the Georgia law violated equal protection
by requiring allocation of punitive damages to the state in product liability cases but not
others, violated the state's constitutional provision prohibiting legislation from
addressing more than one subject matter or containing a matter not stated in its title, and
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. See id. at 1579.
The Georgia Supreme Court declined to follow, or even acknowledge, the district court
opinion, and found the statute to be constitutional. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436
S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993); State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993).
186. 780 F.Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev'd on othergrounds,6 F.3d 497 (8th
Cir. 1993).
187. See id. at 1242; see also Spaur v. Ovens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 510
N.W.2d 854, 868-69 (Iowa 1994) (finding that Iowa's recovery of a portion of multiple
punitive damages awards against a single defendant for the same course of conduct under
its split-recovery statute did not constitute an excessive fine).
188. See Burke, 6 F.3d at 497.
189. See id. at 512 n.26 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 17
(1991)).
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the subject of the bill be adequately expressed in its title, 9 ' the right to access to
courts,"' restrictions on taxing judgments,"' separation of powers, 93 the right
to trial byjury,'94 a plaintiffs "natural right to the enjoyment of the gains of their
industry,"' 95 and a prohibition against demanding a "person's particular services
...without just compensation."' 96 For example, the Oregon Supreme Court
rejected a challenge to its split-recovery statute under the Remedy Clause of the
Oregon Constitution. 97 That clause, which guarantees a remedy for any injury
to absolute common law rights respecting a person, property, or reputation, was
not implicated, the court ruled, because punitive damages were not necessary to
compensate the plaintiff for injury, but were instead intended to punish and deter
egregious conduct.' 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has said that punitive damages have "run
wild" in this country.' 99 Legislators should respond by adopting reforms that
include a higher burden of proof requirement, a heightened liability standard for
punitive damages awards, statutory caps to ensure greater proportionality
between punitive and compensatory damages, and bifurcated trial procedures at
the defendant's request.
Laws requiring a successful plaintiff to share his or her punitive damages
award with the state may be superficially attractive to state legislators, but should
be rejected. Such laws raise serious concerns, including the potential to make
the problem of runaway punitive damages awards even more prevalent. By
reducing the "windfall effect" of punitive damages, jurors may be emboldened
to award larger recoveries than they do today. Defendants also may suffer
190. See Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1069-70 (Alaska 2002); Mack
Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 639; McBride, 737 F.Supp. at 1578; Fust v. Attorney General, 947
S.W.2d 424, 427-28 (Mo. 1997).
191. See State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632, 634 (Ga. 1993).
192. See Gordon v.State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992); Cheatham v. Pohle, 789
N.E.2d 467, 476 (Ind.2003).
193. See Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 430-31.
194. See Evans, 56 P.3d at 1058-59; Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802; Moseley, 436

S.E.2d at 634.
195. See Fust, 947 S.W.2d at 431.
196. See Cheatham, 789 N.E.2d at 476.
197. See DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232, 1237-39 (Or. 2002). See
generallyJunping Han, Note, The Constitutionalityof Oregon's Split-Recovery Punitive
Damages Statute, 38 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 477 (2002).

198. See DeMendoza, 51 P.3d at 1237-45. The court also upheld the statute against
challenge under the state's takings clause, as an unconstitutional revenue bill or tax, and
as violating separation of powers principles. See id. at 1245-48.
199. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
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prejudice at the hands of ajury that awards punitive damages, or decides to give
a higher award, because the jurors know that a portion of the award will go to the
state treasury or to support state programs. Split-recovery statutes also may give
states an incentive to further expand the availability of punitive damages awards
far beyond their traditional use. They also exacerbate conflicts of interest
between plaintiffs and their attorneys, fuel the potential for "regulation through
litigation," and foster constitutional litigation.
For all of these reasons, split-recovery laws that require successful plaintiffs
to share a portion of any punitive damages recovery with the state (or a statespecified fund) should be rejected. Instead, states seeking to enact punitive
damages reforms should: (1) adopt a heightened burden of proof and liability
standard for punitive damages claims; (2) set statutory limits to ensure greater
proportionality between punitive and compensatory damages awards; and (3)
provide for a bifurcated trial at the defendant's request.
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